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DOES THE COSMOLOGICAL ARGUMENT DEPEND 
ON THE ONTOLOGICAL? 
William F. Vallicella 
Does the cosmological argument (CA) depend on the ontological (OA)? 
That depends. If the OA is an argument "from mere concepts," then no; if 
the OA is an argument from possibility, then yes. That is my main thesis. 
Along the way, I explore a number of subsidiary themes, among them, the 
nature of proof in metaphysics, and what Kant calls the "mystery of 
absolute necessity." 
Both in his pre-Critical Sale Possible Basis for a Proof of the Existenc[' of God 
(1763) and in the Critique of Pure Reason (1781), Kant maintains that the 
(Leibniz-Wolff) cosmological argument depends on the ontological. As he 
puts it in the first Critique, 
... the so-called cosmological proof really owes any cogency which it 
may have to the ontological proof from mere concepts. The appeal to 
experience is quite superfluous ... ' 
Of course, Kant does not urge this thesis in praise of the cosmological argu-
ment, but to bury it: the ontological argument fails, and the cosmological 
argument, as depending on the former, fails with it. 
Various attempts have been made to show that there is no such depen-
dency as Kant alleges, the most impressive being that of J. William Forgie.' 
When T first read Forgie's two recent articles on this topic, T thought he had 
definitively refuted Kant's dependency thesis. But I now see, or think I see, 
that the shade of Kant has a plausible rejoinder. 
1. What is Cogency? 
Since the claimed dependence of the cosmological argument (CA) on the 
ontological argument (OA) is in respect of cogency, we need to know what 
this is. "Cogency" is Norman Kemp Smith's rendering of Beweiskraft 
which is literally, and I think more perspicuously, translated as "probative 
force" especially since Kant speaks of theistic proofs rather than arguments. 
In keeping with his project of ascertaining the cognitive value of metaphysi-
ca specialis, Kant is not concerned with a narrowly logical critique of the 
arguments of natural theology, but with an epistemological determination 
of their fitness for producing genuine knowledge. His concern is whether 
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these arguments amount to proofs. How do proofs stand to arguments? 
Although every proof is an argument, not every argument, even if valid, is 
a proof. A valid argument with a false premise is surely no proof of anything, 
but a sound one isn't either: it is not enough that a putative proof be valid with 
true premises; it must also have premises which are known to be true, at least 
by the producers and consumers of the argument. But even this does not suf-
fice: a circular argument could satisfy the foregoing conditions without 
amounting to a proof. If one cannot know the premises of an argument to be 
true without knowing the conclusion to be true, then the argument in question 
is surely no proof. Now consider the following argument: "r am now breath-
ing; therefore, either Kant lived in Koenigsberg or he did not." This argument 
exhibits the foregoing four marks. It is valid, has true premises known to be 
true, and it is noncircular. But it does not prove its conclusion. Thus we need 
to impose a fifth condition, relevance of conclusion to premises. r suggest that 
the foregoing five marks are individually necessary conditions of probative-
ness; whether they are jointly sufficient r leave undecided. Thus a deductive 
argument is probative only if it is (i) valid in point of logical form, has (ii) true 
premises that are (iii) known to be true, (iv) avoids petitio principii, and (v) is 
such that the premises are relevant to the conclusion.3 
Proofs in metaphysics, for Kant at least, must meet further conditions. It 
is important to appreciate just how Teutonically stringent Kant's notion of 
metaphysical proof is. A proof in metaphysics is either apodeictic (apodik-
tisch) or it is no proof at all (A789 B817). Such proofs proceed from unim-
peachable premises with rigorous logic to conclusions that are demonstra-
tively certain. Kant heaps scorn upon the supposition that there could be 
probabilistic arguments in metaphysics. At A775 B803 he remarks that to 
try to prove that God "is probable is as absurd (ungereimt) as to think of 
proving a proposition of geometry merely as a probability."4 Metaphysics 
is knowledge by pure theoretical reason, and what pure reason knows it 
either knows a priori and as necessary, or it doesn't know it at all. This is 
especially so with God, who exists of absolute metaphysical necessity if he 
exists at all. "For the knowledge of what we profess to know as absolutely 
necessary must itself carry with it absolute necessity." (A612 B640) 
To say that the knowledge of what we claim to know as absolutely nec-
essary must itself carry with it absolute necessity says more than that the 
proposition to be known (the conclusion of the proof) must be necessarily 
true; it says that the knowing of the necessarily true proposition must bring 
with it insight into how and that the proposition is necessarily true. A 
"proof" of a necessary truth that does not amount to a proof of the necessi-
ty of its conclusion, by providing insight into how it is possible for its con-
clusion to be necessary, is no proof at all. Thus, to invoke a distinction 
Kant makes at A789 B817, a God-proof cannot be "apagogical" (apagogisch) 
but must be "ostensive" (ostensiv) or "direct" (direkt). If the reader finds 
this obscure, section 7 infra should clarify matters. 
2. Different Dependencies Distinguished 
Having in effect distinguished the rich epistemological concept of proba-
tiveness from the lean logical concept of soundness, where this is under-
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stood in the standard way as a property of those arguments whose form is 
valid and whose premises are true, we should distinguish two dependency 
questions. But before distinguishing them, we need to clarify the notion of 
argument-dependency in general. To say that argument A is dependent 
upon argument B is to say at least this much: A cannot be probative or 
sound unless B is probative or sound. To show that argument A is not 
dependent on argument B, then, it suffices to show that A's being sound or 
probative does not entail B's being sound or probative. Thus to show that 
the CA does not depend on the OA, it suffices to show that the CA's being 
sound or probative does not entail the OA's being sound or probative. 
Now for the two dependency questions. (Q1) Is the CA dependent for its 
probativeness on the OA? (Q2) Is the CA dependent for its soundness on the 
OA? We should be open to the possibility that these questions have differ-
ent answers. Take (Q2) first. The CA is soundness-dependent on the OA 
just in case the CA cannot be sound (in any version) unless the OA is sound 
(in some version). Richard Gale seems to be making a case for soundness-
dependence when he writes that a "successful" cosmological argument 
" ... must ultimately terminate with a self-explaining explainer, in which a 
self-explaining being is one whose existence is entailed by its nature or 
essence, that is, one for whom there is a successful ontological argument.us 
Gale's case for soundness-dependence seems correct. A successful CA must 
terminate with a being whose essence entails its existence, and if so, how 
could there fail to be a sound OA for this conclusion? Here is an example: 
A being whose essence entails its existence is possible. 
A being whose essence entails its existence is either impossible or exists. 
Therefore, a being whose essence entails its existence exists. 
Clearly, this version of the OA is sound if any version of the CA is sound. 
We may answer (Q2) in the affirmative. So there is a clear, if rather unin-
teresting, sense in which the CA is dependent on the OA: the first is sound-
ness-dependent on the second. 
But Gale muddies the waters with his use of "successful." I should 
think that a successful argument would be a probative argument, and not 
merely a sound one. If "successful" means "probative," then perhaps one 
can plausibly argue that the answer to (Ql) should be in the negative. 
Although the CA cannot be sound unless the OA is, it may well turn out 
that a version of the CA is probative even though every version of the OA 
is not. But before we can see how this could be so, we must delve into 
Kant's argument. 
3. Kant's Dependency Argument 
The cosmological argument as Kant understands it involves three steps, as 
he makes clear in the 1763 essay.' The first step purports to take us from a 
contingent being or a world of contingent beings to a being upon which 
they depend for their existence. The second step aims to show that this 
being exists of absolute metaphysical necessity. The third step tries to estab-
lish that this ens necessarium (EN) is God, the ens realissimliln (ER), the maxi-
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mally real or maximally perfect being.? In the first Critique, Kant lumps the 
first two steps together, the better to focus on his primary worry, the move 
from the necessary world-ground to God. Having argued a cOlltingentia 
mundi to a necessary being, how can we show that this being has the attrib-
utes definitive of God? It is here that Kant thinks the cosmological arguer 
must have recourse to the ontological argument. Kant's argument for the 
dependence of the CA on the OA is most succinctly put in his Lectures Oil 
Philosophical Theology8 from his Critical period and I will take these, supple-
mented by passages from CPR, as the basis for the following discussion. 
Kant in effect invites us to consider the following stretch of argumenta-
tion which appears to bring the CA to a successful completion. 
1. There is a being that exists of absolute necessity. (Upshot of first 
half of CA) 
2. "the requisites of absolute necessity are met with solely in the con-
cept of a most real being." (LPT 61) 
Therefore 
3. "the absolutely necessary being is the most real being." (LPT 6]) 
Therefore 
4. The absolutely necessary being is God. 
But, Kant claims, to accept (2) is to endorse the OA. The argument for 
this claim may be set forth as follows: 
5. If "every absolutely necessary being is also a most real being," 
then "every most real being is an absolutely necessary being.'" 
6. The consequent of (5) is "determined a priori from mere con-
cepts."(LPT 62) 
Therefore 
7. "the mere concept of an en tis realissimi must carry its own absolute 
necessity along with it."(LPT 62) 
Therefore 
8. The existence of a most real being follows from its concept, which 
is precisely what the OA implies. 
Therefore 
9. The CA is probative only if the OA is, and is therefore dependent 
on it. 
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4. The Bennett-Forgie Response to Kant's Dependency Argument 
Forgie claims in effect that a cosmological arguer, with perfect consistency, 
can accept (7) while rejecting (8), and thus can insist that the appeal to 
experience in the first half of the CA, far from being superfluous, is indis-
pensable. Jonathan Bennett maintains something similar.lO 
This is a plausible line to take. No doubt the concept of a most real or 
maximally perfect being is the concept of something which, if it exists, nec-
essarily exists, and indeed from its own nature or essence. It is the concept 
of something which has a certain modal status, the status of existing either 
in all possible worlds or in none. Taken in this way, (7) is clearly true, but 
consistent with the denial of (8). For whether the ens realissimum exists in 
fact cannot be "read off" from the concept, as Kant himself would surely 
agree: " .. .if I take the concept of anything, no matter what, I find that the 
existence of this thing can never be represented by me as absolutely neces-
sary, and that, whatever it may be that exists, nothing prevents me from 
thinking its non-existence." (A615 B643) This is why the ontological argu-
ment, which Kant (mis?)represents as an argument "from mere concepts" 
(alls lnuter Begrif!en), lacks probative force." One cannot settle questions of 
existence by conceptual analysis. For with respect to every concept, or at 
least every concept the notes of whose conceptual content are compossible, 
it is always a further question whether anything instantiates it. (Questions 
of nonexistence are a different story: one can ontologically disprove round 
squares and the like.) 
It thus appears that Forgie has put his finger on the flaw in Kant's depen-
dency argument, namely, the inference from (7) to (8). But one ought to 
find it puzzling that Kant, who himself makes what Bennett calls the "con-
ditionalizing move" in refutation of the OA (the retreat from "The ens rt~alis­
simum necessarily exists" to "If it exists, then the ens realissimum necessarily 
exists") will not allow this move to the cosmological arguer. Why does 
Kant think that the inference from (7) to (H) is valid given his own convic-
ticm that nothing is such that its existence follows from its concept? 
There is an argument Kant could employ to forge a logical link between 
(7) and (8): 
a. "absolute necessity is an existence from mere concepts." (LPT 62) 
b. The concept of the ER is the concept of something that exists of 
absolute necessity. 
Therefore 
c. The concept of the ER is the concept of something whose existence 
follows from its concept.12 
So given premise (a), one can derive (c) which is equivalent to (8). It fol-
lows that Forgie's rejection of the inference from (7) to (8) is premised on a 
rejection of (a). The obvious way to reject (a) is by claiming that absolute 
necessity is an existence from essence or possibility, and not from concepts. 
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One could then consistently maintain that the ER's essence entails its exis-
tence without its existence~ being onto logically provable "from mere con-
cepts." One could consistently hold that the CA is free of entanglement 
with the OA "from mere concepts." 
Although Forgie's position is entirely consistent, it appears that 
Bennett's is not. Bennett, invoking the conditionalizing move, rejects (in 
effect) the inference from (7) to (8) and concludes that 1t ••• Kant has altogeth-
er failed in his attempt to show that the cosmological arguer who takes the 
second step [from the EN to the ER] is committed to the validity of the 
ontological argument."n As rejecting the move from (7) to (8), Bennett 
must reject (a). But Bennett goes on to make a "radical criticism" of the CA 
which he sees Kant as poised to make without actually making, a criticism 
that rests on the truth of (a).14 The radical criticism is that there simply can-
not be a logically (broadly logically, metaphysically) necessary being for 
either the CA or the OA to terminate in. For if nothing is such that its exis-
tence follows from its concept, as Kant maintains in his critique of the OA, 
then nothing can exist of absolute logical necessity. But this last inference 
requires for its validity premise (a): "absolute necessity is an existence from 
mere concepts." If absolute necessity is an existence from possibility or 
essence, the inference does not succeed. For we have just seen how one 
can countenance an ens necessarium that is not ontologically provable "from 
mere concepts." 
The upshot is that Bennett cannot have it both ways: he cannot reject 
Kant's dependency argument while accepting the principle that "absolute 
necessity is an existence from mere concepts." Given that he accepts the 
latter and the radical criticism based on it, he should accept the dependen-
cyargument. 
This leaves the question whether Kant himself accepts the radical criti-
cism and (a). I shall take this up below in section 8. 
Thus it would seem that the cosmological arguer can take the following 
seemingly consistent position. (i) The OA "from mere concepts" fails, and 
indeed for the reason Kant adduces. Nevertheless, (ii) a thing is maximally 
perfect if and only if it exists of absolute necessity. Now, (iii) we have (let 
us assume) an a posteriori proof of the existence of an absolutely necessary 
being upon which all contingent beings depend. Therefore, (iv) we have 
an a posteriori proof of the existence of a maximally perfect being which 
proof does not depend for its probativeness on the OA. 
This is not to say that our a posteriori proof is not dependent for its 
soundness on the OA. Of course it is. For if the proposition expressed by 
liThe maximally perfect being exists" is true, then there must be sound 
ontological arguments which feature it as a conclusion. Example: "If the 
maximally perfect being is Itself, then it is." (Inspired by Bonaventura's, Si 
DCllS Deus est, DCllS est.) But soundness is not the issue; probativeness is. 
Forgie appears to have shown that the CA is not probativeness-dependent 
on theOA. 
As Forgie of course realizes, the position just sketched, according to 
which the CA's appeal to experience is indispensable, implies that the 
proposition expressed by itA maximally perfect being exists" is both neces-
sary and knowable only a posteriori. Propositions that enjoy this status are 
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not exactly unknown to recent philosophy. Thus one could say that it is 
Kant's failure to make room in his system for propositions of this type that 
underlies his dependency argument. 
We should also note that if there are necessary truths knowable only a 
posteriori, then, since these cannot be conceptual truths, they must be truths 
grounded in essences distinct from concepts. Armed with a distinction 
between concept and essence, a distinction Kant does not make, we can 
easily see how a position like that of Thomas Aquinas is consistent. Thomas 
both rejected Anselm's proof and held that God's existence is entailed by, 
indeed is identical with, his essence. This is consistent if absolute necessitv 
is an existence from essence rather than an existence from concepts. 0 
Aquinas commentators often claim that the sort of necessity that figures 
in the proofs of the quinquae viae is distinct from the Leibnizian sort of 
necessity (existence in all logically Imetaphysically possible worlds) at 
work in the versions of the CA on which Kant set his critical sights, and 
that therefore Kant's dependency thesis, whether true or false, simply does 
not apply to the cosmological or contingency arguments of the doctor 
angelicus. The operative sort of necessity in Aquinas is said to be lack of 
generability I corruptibility and cognates. But as Forgie rightly points out, 
"although Aquinas may well use a notion of 'necessary being' which is dif-
ferent from the Leibnizian one, his notion of an uncaused necessary being 
entails or involves the Leibnizian notion of a being whose essence involves 
its existence."15 It is difficult to see how such an uncaused necessary being 
would not fall within the scope of Kant's dependency thesis. Besides, how 
could an ontologically simple God, one in which essence is existence, fail to 
have the sort of Leibnizian necessity that would make all arguments in 
support of it subject to Kant's dependency thesis? 
5. A Dependency Argument Immune to the Bennett-Forgie Objection 
Forgie's main point seems clearly correct, namely, that (8) does not follow 
from (7) above. Although the concept of the ens realissimllln (ER) is the con-
cept of something which, if it exists, necessarily exists, it does not follow 
from the mere concept that it exists. So Forgie thinks that (i) the cosmologi-
cal arguer need not endorse the OA, and (ii) that the appeal to experience 
is indispensable to show that something satisfies the concept of the ER. 
But we should note that although the existence of the ER does not follow 
from its concept - since nothing is such that its existence follows from its 
concept - the existence of the ER docs follow from its possibility. 
So if it can be shown that the CA presupposes the possibility of the ER, 
then the CA will be dependent for its probativeness on a modal OA along 
the lines of: The ER is possible; if the ER is possible, then it exists; therefore, 
the ER exists. Ontological arguments like these are not "from mere con-
cepts" (aus lauter Begriffen), and so do not make the mistake of inferring 
existence from a concept. My new and improved dependency argument 
may be outlined as follows. 
10. Either the CA proves that the ER is possible, or it presupposes'" 
that the ER is possible. 
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11. The CA cannot be taken to prove that the ER is possible. 
Therefore 
12. The CA presupposes that the ER is possible. 
13. If the CA presupposes that the ER is possible, then the CA 
depends on the OA. 
Therefore 
14. The CA depends on the OA. 
Premise (10) is self-evident. But premises (11) and (13) require argu-
ment. 
Argument for (11). If a thing is actual, then it is possible. (Ab esse ad 
posse valet illatia.) So if I know that a thing is actual, then I know that it is 
possible. This is consistent with not understanding how the thing is possi-
ble. For example, I can reasonably claim to know that such things as 
motion, temporal passage, and relatedness occur, and are thus possible, 
without understanding how they are possible. (The powerful arguments 
of Zeno, McTaggart, and Bradley respectively, purport to show that these 
things are not possible, and in my opinion these arguments, though they 
have been ably opposed, have never been decisively refuted. Thus these 
arguments show that we do not understand how motion, temporal pas-
sage, and relatedness are possible.) But to the extent that I do not under-
stand how a thing is possible, I am justified in wondering whether the 
thing in question really is actual, and thus really is possible. Thus my 
inability to understand how libertarian freedom of the will is possible, may 
lead me to justified doubts about its existence. '7 And if I have justified 
doubts about its existence, then I am justified in doubting whether my 
putative knowledge of its existence is genuine knowledge. 
Thus although it is obviously true that everything actual is possible, the 
application of this principle in an attempt to prove that a given thing is 
possible is stymied by (i) doubts whether the thing in question really is 
actual, which are especially troublesome when the thing is not sense-per-
ceivable, and (ii) lack of insight into how it could be possible, with (ij) fan-
ning the flames of (D. So I think one must conclude that no CA could be 
taken to prove the possibility of the ER by proving its actuality. For as 
Kant remarks, we have no insight into how the ER is possible. In an 
uncharacteristically "Heideggerian" passage at CPR A613 B641, Kant 
speaks of unconditional necessity as an "abyss" (Abgrund) for human rea-
son where "all support fails us." In trying to secure a Grund for all things, 
we plunge into an Abgrund. Since everything we can represent as existent 
we can just as easily represent as nonexistent (CPR A615 B643), we have no 
insight into how there could be something that exists of absolute necessity. 
Of course it doesn't follow that there cannot be an absolutely necessary 
being; it could easily exist without our understanding how it could exist. 
(And Kant never denies or even seriously doubts the existence of God.) 
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The point is that we cannot know how or that an absolutely necessary 
being is possible through theoretical reason, though we can think and 
believe this possibility. (d. Bxxvi) One does well to recall that Kant's attack 
on metaphysical knowledge is not motivated by a desire to undermine reli-
gious belief, but by a desire to insulate it from sceptical corrosion: "I have 
found it necessary to deny knowledge (Wissen) in order to make room for 
faith (Glauben)."" We cannot prove God's existence, but we cannot dis-
prove it either. 
Having seen that (11) is true, we may infer (12): the CA presupposes 
that the ER is possible. But if so, then the CA depends on the OA for its 
probativeness. 
To appreciate this, recall that the problem for the second half of the CA 
is whether or not one can show that the ens necessarium (EN) is the ens 
realissimum (ER). This is a question of identification, a question of specify-
ing which being this necessary being is. But the attempt to identify the EN 
with the ER presupposes that the ER is possible. '9 For something that has 
been proven to exist (the EN) cannot be identified with something that is 
impossible. Now the ER either necessarily exists or is impossible, which 
implies that its possibility entails its actual existence. So if the attempt to 
identify the EN with the ER presupposes that the ER is possible, then the 
success of this attempt presupposes that an OA such as the following is 
probative, and not just sound: 
The ellS rCl1lissimum is possible 
Either the ens realissill111m is impossible or it is necessarily existent 
Therefore 
The ens realissimum is necessarily existent. 
So it would seem that the CA is after all dependent on the OA, and that the 
appeal to experience is superfluous. For if the CA cannot attain its ultimate 
goal without presupposing in its second half the real possibility of the ER, 
then one can simply begin with this possibility and "run" some such OA as 
the one just given. The recourse to experience would then be an unneces-
sary detour. 
My point, then, is that something like Kant's dependency thesis can be 
defended if we distinguish, as Kant did not, the OA " from mere concepts" 
from the OA from possibility. Forgie is right that the CA does not depend 
for its probativeness on the OA "from mere concepts." The concept of the 
ER is the concept of something that necessarily exists given that it does 
exist; but that it does exist cannot be inferred from its mere concept. But 
given the real (not merely excogitated) possibility of the ER, it follows 
straightaway that the ER exists. Note that this un-Kanhan distinction 
between the concept and the possibility (essence) of the ER is one that 
Forgie himself invokes and must invoke in order to defeat Kant's depen-
dency thesis. (We saw last section that Bennett falls into contradiction 
when he tries to reject Kant's dependency thesis while holding onto the 
principle that absolute necessity is an existence from mere concepts.) So 
although the CA does not depend on the OA "from mere concepts," it does 
depend for its probativeness on the OA from possibility. 
This dependence is damaging to the CA since there is reason to think 
that the OA from possibility is not probative.2l) For how can one show that 
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the ER is really possible? It is part of Kant's point that one cannot show 
this by any analysis of concepts. Leibniz, who thought he could prove the 
possibility of the ER by showing that the realities (perfections) that make 
up the divine nature are compos sible (since they are all positive) "confused 
the possibility of this concept [that of the ERl with the possibility of the 
thing itself." (LPT 55) 
6. Dependency in the First Half of the CA 
If there is a being whose existence is necessary for the existence of all else, it 
of course does not follow that this being is necessary in itself. It is a point of 
modal logic that one cannot validly pass from "Necessarily, if U then G," to 
"If U, then necessarily G." To think otherwise is to confuse the necessitas 
consequentiae with the necessitas consequentiis. If there must be a being on 
which contingent beings depend, then this being is conditionally necessary; 
but it does not follow straightaway that it is unconditionally necessary. 
So one might legitimately wonder whether even the first half of the CA 
can attain its goal. It is supposed to take us from contingent beings to an 
absolutely or unconditionally necessary being upon which they depend for 
their existence. In its first step, as Kant explains in the 1763 essay, it takes 
us to an independent being, one on which all else depends. 21 But how, in 
its second step, can it negotiate the passage from "An independent being 
exists" to "An absolutely necessary being exists"? Kant does not press this 
point in the first Critique, but he could have, and passages elsewhere show 
that he is well aware of it. "In the Wolffian proof one can indeed discern 
the independence, but not the inner necessity [of the first cause or ultimate 
ground]; for its existence is only necessary for the sake of the world."22 
It is clear that if there is an absolutely necessary ground G, then its possi-
bility entails its actual existence. So all the first half of the CA needs to 
prove is the possibility of G. But for the reasons given in the preceding sec-
tion, no CA can prove the possibility of an unconditionally necessary being. 
Not being able to prove it, it must presuppose it. But if the first half of the CA 
presupposes the possibility of G, then surely there is no need for an a posteri-
ori proof of its actuality: if we are given G's possibility, then we can simply 
"run" an ontological argument to establish its actuality. So it seems that the 
first half of the CA, and not just the second half, depends on an OA from 
possibility, so that, once more, the appeal to experience is superfluous. But 
of course this is consistent with denying, as I do deny, that the first half of 
the CA depends on the OA "from mere concepts." 
7. Call One Prove the Necessary from the Contillgent? 
Since any CA must have as its conclusion a necessary proposition, this rais-
es the question: Can there be a probative argument for an unconditionally 
necessary proposition when one of the premises of the argument is contin-
gent? If no, then we have another reason to think that the CA is dependent 
upon the OA. Recall that for Kant, proofs in metaphysics, "transcendental 
proofs,"23 must be ostensive and not apagogical (A789 B817) where an 
ostensive proof is "one which combines with the conviction of its truth 
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[better: conviction of the truth of its conclusion] insight into the sources of 
its truth [better: insight into the sources of its conclusion's truth]." What 
Kant has to say about the distinction I find obscure;24 part of what I will be 
attempting in this section is to attach a tolerably clear sense to "ostensive 
proof." 
No doubt there are sound arguments with contingent premises and nec-
essary conclusions. Trivial example: "Simone Weil died in 1943; therefore, 
either Hillary is furious or she is not." This is a sound argument for a nec-
essary proposition: the premise is true and the argument's form is valid, 
i.e., not possibly such that any argument of this form has true premises and 
a false conclusion. Nontrivial example: 
15. I am now thinking 
Therefore 
16. It is true that I am now thinking 
Therefore 
17. There are truths. 
This is a sound argument in which the premise is contingently true and the 
final conclusion is necessary. That (17) is necessary can be proved by a 
quick reductio: If there are no truths, then it is true that there are no truths; 
but if it is true that there are no truths, then there is at least one truth, 
namely, the truth that there are no truths. But this contradicts the assump-
tion that there are no truths. Therefore, the assumption is false, and there 
are truths. On the other hand, if there are truths, then of course there are 
truths. Therefore, necessarily, there are truths. 
Argument (15)-(17), then, is an interesting case, since it seems to show 
that I can come to know a necessary truth by inferring it from a contingent 
premise which I clearly know. It seems to amount to an a posteriori proof of 
the necessary existence of truths. So it appears to be not just sound, but 
probative. 
But here we need a distinction. Although the argument to (17) is proba-
tive, I claim that the argument to 
17*. Necessarily, there are truths 
is not. It is one thing to come to know a necessary truth; it is another to 
come to know it as necessary. I can know a truth that is necessary without 
knowing that it is necessary. Almost everyone knows that 2 + 2 = 4, and 
thus almost everyone knows at least one necessary truth; but relatively few 
know that, necessarily, 2 + 2 = 4, even though these two propositions are 
logically equivalent. So even if there are a posteriori proofs of necessary 
truths, it is a further question whether they can deliver insight into the 
necessity of necessary truths. If they cannot, then one may doubt whether 
they are fully probative. 
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Suppose we want to prove that there are necessary truths to the Modal 
Fool who says in his heart: All is contingent! We get him to admit that he 
is thinking, that it is true that he is thinking, and that therefore there are 
truths. Although we have gotten him to accept a necessary truth, he won't 
see it as such. He will reply that it is contingent that there are truths, and 
perhaps contingent upon the existence of human beings. How do we 
show him that it is necessarily true that there are truths? My point is that 
we cannot use an a posteriori argument. For even if we can come to know a 
posteriori propositions that are necessarily true, we cannot come to know a 
posteriori that they have this high modal status. To prove to the Modal Fool 
that it is necessarily true that there are truths, we must have recourse to 
some such a priori proof as the reductio ad absurdum given above. The a pos-
teriori proof "really owes any cogency which it may have" to the a priori 
proof; "the appeal to experience is quite superfluous." 
Similarly, a probative CA must not only bring us to the knowledge that 
a ground of contingent beings exists which is absolutely necessary, but also 
to the knowledge that this ground is indeed absolutely necessary. Thus a 
probative CA cannot merely demonstrate the truth of "God exists" (where 
this is a necessary truth), but must demonstrate, i.e., generate knowledge of 
the truth of, "Necessarily, God exists." And this latter is what an a posteri-
ori proof cannot deliver. 
8. The Mystery of Absolute Necessity 
Kant represents a watershed in the history of the theistic proofs the central 
concept of which is that of the ens necessarium. As befits a watershed, 
Kant's thinking teeters ambiguously between the view that (i) the ens neces-
sarium is possible but not provable theoretically either in its actual exis-
tence or in its possibility, and the view that (ii) the ens necessarium is impos-
sible. Here is a passage in support of (i): 
Thus, while for the merely speculative employment of reason the 
supreme being remains a mere ideal, it is yet an ideal without a flaw .. .Its 
objective reality cannot indeed be proved, but also cannot be dis-
proved, by merely speculative reason. lf, then, there should be a moral 
theology that can make good this deficiency, transcendental theology, 
which before was problematic only, will prove itself indispensable in 
determining the concept of this supreme being ... (A 641 B 669) 
If God is an ideal without a flaw, and if the deficiencies of speculative rea-
son can be made good by practical reason, then God must be a really possi-
ble being, even if not one whose real possibility is provable a priori by con-
ceptual analysis. And of course, if God is possible, then he is actually exis-
tent. Although we cannot know by speculative reason the possibility (and 
hence the necessity) of God's existence, we can think it and believe it with-
out contradiction. This implies that there is no contradiction in the concept 
of a necessary being. It is a concept we can coherently think even if we can 
neither prove nor disprove that it applies to anything. 
As further support for (D, consider Kant's remark that "the absolute 
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necessity of God" is a "mystery in rational religion."(LPT 163) Mysteries 
are defined as "truths whose possibility reason cannot see into .... "(LPT 163) 
Kant is thus committed to saying that God's absolutely necessary existence 
is a truth, but not one into whose possibility reason can have any insight. 
This again implies that the ens necessarium is possible. 
One more passage, pages further along in the CPR than most ever get: 
... we must recognize that while the unconditioned necessity of the exis-
tence of a being is altogether inconceivable to us, and that every specu-
lative proof of a necessary supreme being is therefore rightly to be 
opposed on subjective grounds, we have yet no right to deny the possi-
bility of such a primordial being in itself. .. (A792 B821, emphasis Kant's) 
But other things that Kant says imply that there is a contradiction in the 
concept of a necessary being, and thus that such a being is logically impos-
sible. For if 
a. Every existential judgment is synthetic a posteriori (A598 B626) 
and 
b. No synthetic 11 posteriori judgment can be necessary 
it follows that 
c. No existential judgment can be necessary 
which implies that 
d. No being can exist necessarily 
whence we may infer that 
e. The ens necessarium is impossible. 
One may arrive at this conclusion in another way. Kant tells us that 
" ... absolute necessity is an existence determined from mere concepts." 
(A607 B635) So if anything exists of absolute necessity, then it should be 
ontologically provable from its mere concept. But nothing is ontologically 
provable from its mere concept. Therefore, nothing can exist of absolute 
necessity. 
To put it in still another way, the concept of a necessary being is a self-
contradictory one (hence one to which nothing can correspond) since, as a 
concept it cannot entail existence, but as a concept of a Ilecessary being, i.e., a 
being whose existence is determined from its concept, it must entail exis-
tence. In other words, the concept of a necessary being is the concept of a 
thing whose existence is "determined from" its concept; but no concept is 
the concept of a thing whose existence is "determined from" its concept. 
Kant thus seems committed to both (i) and (ii). He is committed to say-
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ing both that the existence of God is really possible, though not theoretical-
ly provable, and that the existence of God is really impossible. Anyone 
who does not see this tension, or thinks it can be easily resolved, has not 
read Kant very closely and will not be able to understand his "watershed" 
significance in the history of natural theology. 
The tension is reflected in the way Kant criticizes the CA. The CAr like 
the OAr must terminate in a logically (broadly logically, metaphysically) 
necessary being. Now if a logically necessary being is one whose existence 
follows from its concept, and if Kant is right that this move from concept to 
existence is illegitimate, then there simply cannot be a logically necessary 
being, and the CA collapses. Why then doesn't Kant simply deliver this 
"radical criticism" of the CA (as Bennett calls it while endorsing it) thus 
avoiding the rigmarole and fancy footwork of his actual argument? 
The answer, I think, is that to deny the ens necessarium is as dogmatic as 
to affirm it. Equivalently, it would be dogmatic to insist that all beings are 
contingent, or that one has proved any such thing. The Critical path is a via 
media between scepticism and dogmatism. Accordingly, Kant cannot be 
interpreted as denying the possibility of an ens necessarium, or a being to 
whose essence existence belongs. The EN and its possibility can neither be 
proven nor disproven. We can think the EN (and must think it for moral 
purposes), but we cannot know whether it is possible or impossible. 
This explains why Kant, to put it anachronistically, did not give 
Findlay's ontological disprooF" I would put Findlay's argument as fol-
lows: 
A maximally perfect being cannot exist contingently. 
Necessarily, everything that exists exists contingently. 
Therefore 
Necessarily, a maximally perfect being does not exist. 
As Findlay came to realize in the fullness of time, this argument lacks pro-
bative force. 2" For how could anyone claim to know the minor? How 
could one prove that, necessarily, everything (or every concrete individual) 
exists contingently? That appears to be as far beyond us as a proof of the 
real possibility of the ens realissimum. 
If this is right, then Kant cannot flatly and dogmatically claim, as he 
does in many places, that "absolute necessity is an existence determined 
from mere concepts." For we have seen this dictum entail in a few short 
steps the impossibility of the ellS necessarium. What he must say is some-
thing like: "absolute necessity for us can only be an existence determined 
from mere concepts"; or, "the only absolute necessity into which we can 
have any insight is an existence determined from mere concepts"; or, "the 
only way we could know that there is a necessary being would be if 
absolute necessity were an existence determined from mere concepts." 
But if we make these backpedaling emendations, Kant's dependency 
argument collapses. For the reason Kant thinks the cosmological argu-
ment depends on the ontological argument "from mere concepts" is 
COSMOLOGICAL ARGUMENT 455 
because he thinks that an absolutely necessary being is one whose exis-
tence is "determined from mere concepts" (A 607 B 635), and is therefore 
ontologically provable. 
If there is a being whose absolutely necessity of existence is grounded, 
not in concepts, but in its own essence or nature, then there is no longer 
any reason to think that the CA depends on the OA "from mere concepts." 
But as I showed in section 5 supra, the CA does depend on the OA from 
possibili ty. 
In sum, Kant's position is internally inconsistent. His dependency argu-
ment requires the assumption that absolute necessity is an existence deter-
mined from mere concepts. But his repeated assurances that the ER is pos-
sible, albeit unknowable, entail that absolute necessity is not an existence 
determined from mere concepts. So Kant is committed to both affirming 
and denying the assumption in question. 
9. Where Do We Co from Here? 
The main systematic (as opposed to exegetical) points to emerge from the 
discussion in sections 5, 6, and 7 are that (i) the CA in its second half 
depends for its probative force on the OA from possibility inasmuch as it 
presupposes but cannot prove the real possibility of the ens rmlissimum; (ii) 
the CA in its first half does so as well inasmuch as it presupposes but can-
not prove the real possibility of the ens necessariulll; and (iii) both halves of 
the CA depend for their probativeness on the OA from possibility inas-
much as there cannot be an a posteriori proof of a necessary proposition, 
given Kant's stringent standards of proof. 
We seem to face a dilemma with respect to the very possibility of the ens 
necessarium. Either we prove its possibility from experience or we prove it 
a priori. But we have seen that cosmo-theology fails to prove this possibili-
ty a posteriori just as onto-theology fails to prove it a priori. Onto-cosmology 
may provide a way between the horns. Kant's 1763 argument for the exis-
tence of Cod is an example: it argues from the noncontingent existence of 
possibilities (without which there could not be a world) to the existence of 
Cod.2? Curiously, Kant does not discuss this argument in the CPR. Was he 
justified in rejecting it?28 
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